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Abstract 
The notion of democratic deficit has been at the centre of many debates on the 
European Union for the last 30 years. The reason is, to a certain degree, linked to the lack of 
legitimacy of the European Commission, which is not elected and remote from the European 
citizens. However, the Commission seems to have found a positive way to increase its 
legitimacy by the inclusion of civil-society in the decision-making process. The interaction 
between the Commission and two Environmental NGOs will therefore be analysed in order to 
make a constructive contribution to the debate. The present paper does not limit itself to 
normative statements on reality and considers that there is more to socio-political relations 
than “true” verifiable facts. Therefore, it is not limited to the formal decision-making process, 
and goes deeper into the socialisation process at play between the different actors. The 
outcome is that the Environmental NGOs studied appears as valuable models for the 
implementation of new democratic channels for the representation and participation of 
European citizens.  
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Introduction: Discussing Democracy 
 
The concept of democratic deficit has become a major issue for the European Union 
because of the gradual extension of the powers of its institutions over those of the Member 
States. The democratic deficit can be linked to the concept of legitimacy, in the way that a 
governing system can only acquire a democratic quality by insuring its legitimacy regarding 
the governed people. When considering the democratic deficit, it is important to look at what 
is referred to as “democracy” in a European context. Indeed, when one proclaims the EU as 
being undemocratic, one consequentially opposes it to a system that is considered as 
democratic. This system of reference can be found among most of the European democracies. 
Indeed, however different those societies may be, they have two major characteristics in 
common: the separation of ‘powers’ and the accountability of the government through 
universal elections1. Both concepts can be traced back to Aristotle and have found their way 
into most of the European democracies. The separation of power, as established formally into 
the modern European political system by Montesquieu in his The Spirit of Laws, has become 
the base of the European democracies. According to Montesquieu: “it is an eternal experience, 
that any man who is given power is inclined to abuse it; he will keep going until he finds 
limits” (1749: book XI, point4). Therefore, in order to prevent any authoritarian decision-
making as well as the centralization of power into a dictatorial type of governance, the three 
major powers2 of the state should be shared among equal institutions, which can check each 
other’s tendency to abuse their power. As Pierre Manent (1987) says, the main idea is to 
separate the will from what it wants so that it does cannot make decisions for its own benefit, 
but for the good of the community. Moreover, Montesquieu’s conception of mankind implies 
that those powers have to be checked by the people in order to keep those institutions away 
from the temptation of abusing them. This is the essence of the modern discussion about the 
democratic deficit of the EU and about the lack of legitimacy of the institutions. How can the 
                                                      
1 This principle is present in the art.16 of the declaration of Human Rights of 1789, the precursor of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and a foundation of modern democracies.  
2  The three powers are the legislative power (power to decide how the society should be), the executive power 
(power to make it happen) and the judiciary power (power to judge if it is done in accordance with the laws). 
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European people be sure that those persons entrusted with the power to decide over them, do 
it in accordance to their will and do not abuse the power linked to their position?  
 On the question of separation of powers, the EU appears to feet increasingly into the 
mould of the European democracy. The separation of powers3 is respected in a majority of 
cases and will be even more if the Lisbon treaty is ratified4. However, the governance system 
of the EU is not fitting the traditional representative democracy otherwise spread throughout 
the EU, thus leading to a problem of legitimacy. In that configuration, only the parliament is 
directly elected, leaving the Commission in a precarious position concerning its “democratic” 
quality. The Council can claim legitimacy since it is composed of elected officials, but 
verifying that claim would require discussion that will not take place here. In order to solve its 
problem of democracy, the Commission needs to demonstrate its legitimacy to govern, “even 
though” it is not directly elected by the people. The introduction of elections for the 
Commission is out of the question for the time being. Therefore, the Commission needs to 
find other ways to gain democratic legitimacy.  
Representativity is not necessarily the only way to go for the EU and other forms of 
democratic configurations can be considered. The current model of democracy in place in the 
European countries insures that the people have a means of control on the leaders in charge of 
making decisions by using a representative model of government. Each of those rulers is 
representative of a small portion of the people and can be removed after a defined period 
through elections. Even if this model was to be applied to the EU, it does not seem that the 
dilemma of the concentration of power would disappear since representative democracies 
tends to be plagued by a concentration of specialized “representatives”, which makes a living 
out of the function, thus concentrating power onto themselves. This situation has resulted in 
the distancing between representatives and represented. In order to counter that aspect of the 
natural evolution of representative democracy, scholars have started to discuss the possibility 
to implement a participatory democracy, where each element of the represented population 
could take part into the decision-making process. This model would have the advantage to 
reduce the gap that appeared between representatives and represented. 
 The necessity to bring a feeling of democracy to the EU has become even more 
evident since the ratification crisis of the Maastricht treaty in 1992. The Commission has been 
actively working on acquiring more powers in the decision-making process during the 
                                                      
3 the Commission (executive), the Council/Parliament (legislative) and European Court of Justice (judiciary) 
4 The more policy areas will enter the scope of supranationality, and the more the balance between executive 
and legislative will be respected. 
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following decades, and the necessity of legitimizing its policies has become inevitable 
(Føllesdal 2006: 152-154). In order to do so, the Commission has decided to use the civil 
society5 as a channel of legitimization in order to insure the adequacy of its actions with the 
interest of the people. This type of legitimization is linked to efficiency in the fact that it can 
insure that decisions are made in accordance with the interests and the needs of the governed. 
It is therefore interesting to study that decision in a normative perspective. However, it is not 
constructive to make normative statements without any link to reality. The following 
normative discussion on the legitimacy of the Commission’s decisions will be supported by 
the observation of actual measures taken by the Commissions in order to gain legitimacy. As 
Myrto Tsakatika (2005) points out, most of the intentions of the Commission on that matter 
can be extracted from the White Paper on Governance. It exposes the conflicting views of the 
Commission between the legitimacy by the results introduced by Jean Monnet during the 
creation of the EU and a representational legitimacy introduced in a recent period by scholars 
studying the gap between the Commission and the European citizens. It also introduces the 
idea that The Commission will gain much legitimacy by including representatives of the civil 
society, in our case interest groups, since it will make the commission’s decisions more 
‘efficient’ in the same time that it will introduce a share of participatory democracy into the 
decision-making process. This will constitute the second point of my analysis since it can help 
to discuss democracy. Moreover, the environmental policy is a very interesting case because it 
displays an elaborated interaction between the Commission and a well-structured 
organisation, which can be used as model for a constructive discussion on democracy in the 
European Union.  
Previous Studies 
The problem of democratic deficit has led the EU to look for measures that could help 
countering it. The most noticeable one is the introduction of civil society within the decision-
making process with the claim that including direct representatives of people’s everyday life 
will make the decisions taken at the EU level more legitimate. This claim has awakened the 
attention of many scholars. Dawid Friedrich from the University of Bremen has made an 
interesting participation to the discussion in the domain of Environmental policy and the 
inclusion of civil society (Friedrich, 2006). He assessed the quality of the relation between the 
                                                      
5  This paper will not go any deeper in a normative definition of civil society, but will look at some actors 
considered as part of the civil society by the Commission, in order to better assess ‘their’ role. (see also: White 
Paper on Governance) 
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European Institutions and selected representatives of the civil society through the study of the 
REACH regulation and a series of interviews of members from NGOs and the European 
Institutions. His aim is to evaluate the degree of development of participative democracy 
through the channel of civil society, which he considers as a “transmission belt” (Friedrich, 
2006: 3). This evaluation has a very normative standpoint, which requires the presence of 
several factors in order for participatory democracy to be. Those factors are the formal 
accessibility of NGOs to, transparency of, and inclusion within, the decision-making process. 
However, it is clear that such a democratic structure does not exist yet within the European 
decision-making process, a fact that is corroborated by Friedrich’s findings. He focuses too 
much on participatory democracy as a model without taking into account the fact that it needs 
to be incorporated within a thousand years old model of governance. He deplores the fact that 
participatory infrastructures did not keep up the pace with the discourse of the EU, but his 
argument becomes too critical (Friedrich, 2006: 31). According to him, the participation of 
civil society should be artificially formalised in order to be effective at the EU level, but 
history shows that this type of management do not always give the best results. I will rather 
advocate that institutionalisation be deeply linked to socialisation and that, if effort are kept in 
the same direction, the effective integration of civil society will come. However, his work 
contains abundant valuable data and clearly shows that the interaction between the EU and the 
civil society is at a beginning. In another segment of civil society, we can find an interesting 
study of the institutionalisation of participation through unions by Joel D. Wolf, who comes 
with an answer to a noteworthy dilemma, brought by Robert Michel in his work on the 
oligarchical tendencies of modern democracy. Michels claims that institutionalised 
participation, as can be found in the unions, leads to the appearance of an oligarchic type of 
leadership, which usually cut the base from the top within the union. A very interesting point 
since it seems to be found within NGOs has well. The “oligarchisation” of NGOs means that 
the leadership is hold by specialised elites, which tends to settle at that level and prevent the 
base from participating. In the contrary, Wolf answers that democratic participation is 
possible due to the process of solidarity and community formation that such unions generate 
and the educational principal it fosters, which in turn restore the link between representatives 
and represented that has been lost during the development of representative democracy.  
Problem formulation 
The goal of this thesis is two-fold. First, it aims at assessing the possibility of the Commission 
to gain legitimacy through the inclusion of NGOs into the decision-making process, and thus 
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consolidating the democratic link between the EU and the European citizens; secondly, at 
discussing the quality of the democratic link established by this inclusion.  
Disposition 
In order to answer the problem formulation, this thesis will follow a dual structure. 
The first party (chapter 1 and 2) will address the methodological and the theoretical structure 
of the thesis, without much link to the empirical case. The methodology will expose the object 
of study, the type of data considered and the actors involved in the interaction. The theoretical 
part will focus on the concept of legitimacy, on the political structure in which it will be 
applied, and add the theory of participatory democracy in order to enrich the debate on the 
democratic deficit of the EU. The second party will focus on the object of study itself, the 
interaction between the Commission and Environmental NGOs. The analytical findings, both 
factual and extrapolated, will be depicted in a first section (chapter 3). They will then be 
discussed in correlation with the theoretical structures in a second section (chapter 4) that will 
encompass legitimacy, institutionalisation and democracy. Finally, a brief conclusion will 
present the contribution this thesis can make to the debate on democracy in the EU and open it 
toward further researches that could complement the present one.  
 
1. Methodology 
 
Object of study 
In order to obtain a factual perception of this legitimization process initiated by the 
Commission, I will focus on the environmental policy, because it can be considered as an 
established supranational policy where the EU is more active than the MS6 themselves. This 
is partly due to the fact that policy-makers gradually recognized that environmental problems 
could not be dealt within a national perspective, since they were global problems, and partly 
because this policy area was not part of the group of policies constituting the core of the 
nation-state’s sovereignty, namely defence and taxation. Therefore, it was easier for the 
member-states to surrender their powers to the EU in that area, a process which began in the 
1970s but was formalized in the SEA in 1986. However young this policy may be, it has been 
important in the contest for power between supranational and national levels and can be 
                                                      
6 Member‐States of the EU 
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considered as one belonging to the supranational level (Lenschow 2005: 307-309). To such 
extent, that the Commission used this policy area to promote its role as a supranational actor 
by linking “europeanness” and “greenness” (Ibid 2005: 313). If it was primarily linked to the 
regulation of environmental matters affecting the creation of the internal market, it rapidly 
went beyond that scope, to become part of the core values of the EU as promoted by the 
Commission (Ibid 2005: 309). It finally acquired a strong supranational quality with the 
generalisation of Co-decision and QVM to the environmental policy area by the Treaties of 
Maastricht and Amsterdam. Having a strong supranational character, this policy-area is then 
an interesting topic for the discussion about the Commission’s legitimacy. 
 Among all representatives of the civil society present at the European level, it seems 
that European environmental NGOs7 are the most interesting case. They have recently 
assembled into a network called Green10, which gathers about 20 mil members. Many of 
them have created a specific office in charge of lobbying at the EU level. Those ENGO’s 
represent their members as political representatives represent their voters. If they do not find 
their work satisfying, they can remove their support (and money). Moreover, becoming a 
member of an NGO can be paralleled with supporting a political party on the ground of its 
electoral program. This study will therefore focus on the interaction between Environmental 
NGOs (ENGO) and the Commission. For practical purpose, it cannot assess every single 
ENGO and will therefore concentrate on the two major ENGOs of the Green 10, namely 
WWF and Greenpeace. They both show a well-established interaction with the Commission 
and have been lobbying at the European level for many years now.  
This study will also focus on the discourse of both parties in order to understand better 
their mental configuration, since it considers it a constructive factor of this interaction. In 
order to do so, it will rely largely on qualitative interviews of the three actors in presence. 
Those interviews have been done at the European offices of WWF and Greenpeace, as well as 
at DG environment. In that situation, the discourse of the Commission must be taken 
carefully. Even though it is constitutive of the Commission’s identity, it is also a political tool. 
Therefore, one must remain aware that not all the words of the representatives of the 
Commission can be taken for granted. They rather reflect the logic of appropriateness present 
inside the Commission. It is very difficult to draw the line objectively between what the 
Commission actually believes and what it says. Therefore, it has to be paralleled with the 
claims of green interest groups, which are subject to the same type of criticism, and with 
                                                      
7 European Environmental NGOs will be referred to as ENGOs. 
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factual observation, such as the progressive institutionalization of their relation and its impact 
on policy-making. In order to do that, I will limit the empirical data to the study of a 
legislation on CO2 emissions from passenger cars, to a report from a meeting at the UK 
permanent representation in Brussels between Lords, the secretary general of the Commission 
Secretariat, and the director of the WWF EPO, and finally to three interviews with one 
representative of each party. The first interview was conducted with Tony Long, the director 
of WWW European Unit Office, the second one with Marta Vertier, GMO campaigner for 
Greenpeace European Unit and the third one with Katharina Spens, an Environment Policy 
Officer from the DG Environment. Since this study focuses on a social institutionalist 
perspective, it will rely on interviews rather than pure quantifiable facts.  Those interviews 
can help to grasp the mental configuration of each actor in order to establish a picture of the 
interaction in a social perspective. In the same way, the meeting held by the Chamber of 
Lords can help to assess the actual relation between interest groups and the Commission and 
be a valuable source of information regarding the discourse of both parties in that matter. 
However, I will parallel that discourse with an actual occurrences of this relation, which can 
be observed through the transparency initiative (COM(2008) 323 final) as well as in the 
recent discussions on a regulation to reduce CO2 emissions from passenger cars 
(COM(2007)856 final). Here again, one needs to remain aware of the fact that those two 
occurrences do not allow to objectively assess the contact between an interest group and the 
Commission in term of quantity, but rather in term of quality. However, this is a minor 
problem since it is the contact itself, which will trigger a socialization process, which can lead 
to greater integration of the interest groups into the decision process in the future.  
 
Actors: European institutions, ENGOs and EIOs 
The pre-proposal part of the decision-making process of the EU, concerning 
environmental decisions, can be schematized by a quite complex equation with multiple 
variables. Here is a simplified version of that equation which can give an overview of what is 
happening: Z = X10 + Yn>10 + I + c, or: COM decision = ENGO x 10 + EIOs x n + influence of 
other institutions + independent citizens. X and Y are the main variables in the sense that they 
are the most numerous and influential. ENGOs can easily be reduced to the Green 10 network 
but EIOs represents an almost unlimited possibility of cases. For making this research 
meaningful and understandable, I will only focus on X, but a study of each of those variables 
would be required to be able to pretend to objective truth regarding the decision-making 
Clément Guasco   Bachelor Thesis, Spring term 2009   
 
 
 
Page 7 of 38 
process of the Commission. A case study8 can help to limit the number of variables, but it will 
not give a general picture of the process since X, Y and c would change on a case-to-case 
basis. Before being able to assess the link between environmental NGOs and the Commission 
in a democratic perspective, I will make a concise presentation of the Variables/actors that 
will be discussed later on. This presentation will necessarily be reductive since it cannot take 
into consideration every single actor in the process, but it will focus on the major ones in the 
most objective manner possible. This thesis is focusing on specific actors from the civil 
society doing active lobbying toward the European Institutions, but not on civil society itself. 
It considers as lobbying any activity of non-governmental groups aiming at influencing the 
decision taken by EU institutions during the policy making-process. It is not the aim to make 
grand discourses on the nature of civil society and its composition, but rather to focus on a 
specific part of civil society and to assess its interaction with the Commission. It will 
therefore consider civil society from the Commission’s point of view (Report CPCS, 2a). The 
purpose of this research is thus to assess the quality of the interaction between the 
Commission and some ENGOs in order to participate to the debate on legitimacy and 
democracy in the EU. However, we must keep in mind that the actors in presence are of 
multiple origins and qualities and can therefore not be limited to a dual interaction 
EU/ENGOs. Several actors will appear along that study, even though it focuses only on three 
of them. Here is a brief presentation of those actors, which will help to understand the 
structure of that study.  
EU institutions 
Even though several EU institutions have an interesting role to play in the decision-
making process and a functional interaction with civil society, this thesis will focus on the 
Commission since it owns the power of initiating the laws. The Commission is the most 
concerned by the discussion on democratic deficit since it cannot claim representativity 
through election like the European Parliament or the Council. Both institutions are also the 
place of lobbying and have daily encounters with the ENGOs. They would be perfect objects 
of study for further research, which could complement the present thesis. 
Representatives from the industries: economically interested organisations 
Representatives from the industries constitute the third pole of the interaction. They 
differ from the environmental NGOs in the fact that they protect or even promote economical 
                                                      
8  Based on one legislation  
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interest rather than moral values or political programs. They are mainly representative from 
the industries, but in order to avoid a reductive classification, they will be referred to as 
Economically Interested Organisations (EIO), which include other economically interested 
members from non-industrial parts of the civil society. This separation into NGO and EIO is 
for the sole purpose of this thesis and does not mean that NGO do not have any economical 
interest or that EIO do not have any moral interests. It rather emphasizes the main motivation 
behind their action out of a need for schematization that such a study requires. Moreover, 
EIOs cannot be a channel for legitimacy or participation since they are not connected to the 
European citizens. 
Environmental NGOs 
Environmental NGOs represents the largest non-profit groups within the field of 
environmental policy. The major motivation of those organisations is to protect and promote 
moral values, such as the protection of nature and the implementation of a mode of 
development that will not endangered non-born members of our society (i.e. our descent). 
This motivation is in anyway relatively more altruistic than that of the economically interested 
organizations. In our case, the ENGOs have created a network of the 10 most active NGOs at 
the European Level in order to gain some weight against larger EIO. This Network is called 
the Green 10 and possesses a shared website.  
The Green 10 is just a platform for the elaboration of coordinated actions and each of 
the 10 ENGOs remains completely independent. This thesis will therefore focus on the two 
largest ENGOs of the Green 10 since they possess the strongest voice, renowned public image 
and the largest number of members9. Those two ENGOs are World Wide Fund for nature 
(WWF) and Greenpeace. Both ENGOs have a hierarchical structure going from the 
international office to the national offices and then to local offices. This structure itself 
presents specific qualities that can be used in the discussion of the necessity and feasibility of 
democratic participation within the EU. All the levels are linked together in a pyramidal 
structure where decisions travel from the top to the bottom and vice versa.  Both WWF and 
Greenpeace are membership-based ENGOs, which means that they receive most of their 
funding from their members, which can provide or withdraw their support at anytime. This 
situation creates a strong link between the ENGO and its members, providing for a good 
channel for participation. They both encourage the participation of their members through a 
system of volunteers. However, it seems that Greenpeace represent the best model for a 
                                                      
9  A presentation of the Green 10 network will be made in the next subchapter 
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discussion on participatory democracy since only physical persons can be members. Both 
ENGOs have a European Office dedicated to lobbying activities towards the EU institutions. 
Those Offices present a very similar working method and are both linked to a board of 
management issued from the national offices of the biggest European countries. This is their 
direct formal link to the general policy of the ENGO.  
To summarize, this thesis will mainly focus on the interaction between the 
Commission and two major ENGOs, which, according to the Commission, are part of civil 
society. However, it is important to keep in mind the larger structure in which this interaction 
takes place while reading it. Moreover, other actors such as individuals and scholars can 
participate to the decision-making process, but it does not appear, neither in the official 
reports nor in the discourses of the interviewees, that their participation is significant enough 
to be taken into account in the above mentioned interaction.  
Green 10: gaining weight in the equation 
A presentation of the actors would not be complete without introducing the Green 10, 
which contains both ENGOs studied in that thesis. It is an informal network of major 
European ENGOs. It gathers very different types of ENGOs. The members of the Green 10 
are the European Federation for Transport and Environment (T&E), International Friends of 
Nature, Climate Action Network Europe (CAN), Friends of the Earth Europe (FoE), European 
Environmental Bureau, European Public Health Alliance – Environment Network, WWF 
European Policy Office, Birdlife International, Greenpeace European Unit and CEE 
Bankwatch Network. They can be classified according to different criteria such as their 
structure, the fact that they have a European representation in Brussels or that they are purely 
European-based.  
 Structure: there are two major types of structures, one hierarchical and centralised, such as 
for Greenpeace, WWF or Birdlife international, and one in loose network of local 
associations such as FoE or CAN. The network structure relies on much smaller and more 
numerous units and is therefore more efficient at the local level, while larger centralised 
NGOs are focusing on lobbying at higher levels such as national governments or the EU.  
 Representation in Brussels: Those NGOs can also be classified according to the fact that 
they are, or are not, active at the EU level. Larger centralised NGOs all have a 
representation office in Brussels, such as Greenpeace or WWF while network structured 
NGOs are less present (ex: FoE). 
Clément Guasco   Bachelor Thesis, Spring term 2009   
 
 
 
Page 10 of 38 
 International vs. EU based NGOs: even though they have a dedicated European Office 
many of those NGOs represent members from non-EU countries, such as Greenpeace, 
WWF or Birdlife International. 
Their common point is that they base their legitimacy on representation, which they achieve 
through membership. They came together in order to enlarge their support. Actually, even if 
some of their 20 million members are also situated in other developed countries, the large 
majority of this number consists of European Citizens. Membership usually requires the 
payment of a symbolic sum and is open to all, regardless of sex, age or nationality, though it 
often requires holding a resident permit within the country of registration of the NGO. 
 
 
2. Theoretical edifice 
 
Legitimacy, and the democratic quality it brings, cannot be reduced to the link 
between nation-states and their citizens through direct elections. Many other aspects must be 
taken into account in order to give it a modern sense. Before doing so, it is important to define 
the theoretical structure in which this research will develop. It will include the concept of 
legitimacy and the structure of governance in which it is to be applied. Once legitimacy has 
been defined in a structure of governance specific to the EU, the debate will be enriched by a 
discussion on participatory democracy brought by the incorporation of ENGOs within the 
decision-making process. 
Legitimacy 
The discussion on legitimacy can be very delicate since it is a very subjective concept, 
which has been given various, and sometime opposite, definitions. A received definition of 
legitimacy can be found in Schuman’s work (Koppell 2008; OSSWAARDE, NIJHOF & 
HEYSE 2008; Lister 2003): 
 
Legitimacy is a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are 
desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, 
beliefs and definitions (Schuman 1995: 574). 
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On top of his definition of legitimacy, Schuman concludes that legitimacy is a very 
variable concept that will differ according to the context (1995: 573). It must therefore be 
applied to a particular case before one can draw any conclusions on its nature and its 
necessity. Moreover, the concept of legitimacy has a dual quality in the fact that it is 
“possessed objectively but created subjectively” (ibid 1995: 574). In other words, it is 
considered as an objective fact by the individuals and at the same time socially constructed. 
Legitimacy is therefore based on the belief that the legitimated entity behaves in accordance 
with the values of the social group. However, the medium of accordance is not necessarily the 
same in each social structure. As Schuman (1995: 574) states, an organisation may not respect 
the values of the social group yet remain legitimate because it does not provoke public 
disapproval.   
In a European context, that discussion is made even more difficult by the fact that it is 
still impossible to ‘clearly’ classify the EU as a national/federal or as an international system 
of governance. However, this demarcation remains central to the definition of legitimacy, 
since scholars discussing legitimacy in an international perspective do not perceive it in the 
same way than those discussing it in a national perspective. In an International Relations 
perspective, the link between direct representation and legitimacy is much thinner than in a 
national oriented one. For example, Jonathan G. S. Koppell (2008) discusses Global 
Governance Organizations’ legitimacy in relation to their authority, in a context where direct 
representation is not conceivable yet 10. He bases his discussion on Schuman’s tripartite 
division of legitimacy, but does not consider the necessity of a formal representational link 
between the institution in charge of authority and the individuals over which that authority is 
exercised. This approach contrasts very much with some of the discussions on input 
legitimacy at the European level. They have a stronger focus on citizens’ will and local 
representation (see Beetham and Lord 1998; and Abromeit 1998 cited in Newman 2006: 388-
389). It is, therefore, necessary to assemble several aspects of legitimacy in order to produce a 
richer debate.  
 
The triple definition of legitimacy 
The tripartite division of Schuman distinguishes between a normative, a cognitive and 
a pragmatic legitimacy. The normative legitimacy defines what the criteria for an institution 
are, in order to become the “just holder” of the power to decide over a community. It means 
                                                      
10 GGOs such as the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund or the World Trade Organization 
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that there is no specific criterion for legitimacy out of the one already in place. In our case, the 
most received conception of normative legitimacy is public accountability through direct 
election. Even if the citizens doubt that their political representatives really listen to them, 
they will not question the legitimacy of the system because it is normatively legitimate. 
Nevertheless, normative legitimacy is a problem for the Commission, which cannot adopt the 
structure of a legitimized institution, and which have to struggle with legitimate holders of 
authority, the member-states. On the other side, the cognitive and pragmatic legitimacy focus 
on a purely psychological aspect of legitimacy, outside of any political system of reference. 
Cognitive legitimacy considers to which extend the institution is unconsciously accepted by 
the members of the community. As opposed to cognitive legitimacy, which presupposed an 
unconscious acceptance of the right to make decisions, the pragmatic legitimacy emphasizes 
the conscious “interests-based” acceptance. The institutions therefore become legitimate 
because the affected parties find it in their interest to consider it as such. This is the base of 
the legitimacy as promoted by the Commission. It adopts a functionalist perspective and 
argues that the decisions of the Commission are legitimate because they benefit the European 
citizen (Newman 2006: 588). It is therefore legitimised by its results and will remain 
legitimate as long as it performs well. However, this situation cannot prevent any deviation 
from the will of the people prior to its happening. It can only be detected after the outcome of 
a proposal is rejected by the public opinion, which in the EU case is not even fully formed 
yet. To summarize, normative legitimacy is the construct, whose hold on reality is strongest. 
It does not concern the decisions made but the system in which they are made. It does not 
require the citizens to believe that they have an actual impact on the system of governance 
(cognitive) or to think that their interests are best promoted by the established system even 
though they have no say in it (pragmatic). This is the main problem of the Commission which, 
anyway it might go, is unable to claim normative legitimacy in a European context. Moreover, 
the recent referenda on the constitutional treaty and the Lisbon treaty have shown that both 
cognitive and pragmatic legitimacy tend to have evade the grasp of the Commission. 
 
Input and Output Legitimacy 
Where Schuman solely focuses on legitimacy as a passive, post-policy, reaction from 
the governed, Michael Newman (2006: 388-389) comes with a complementary discussion on 
input and output legitimacy. The EU being a hybrid construct, halfway between international 
and national configurations, the tripartite definition of legitimacy is not covering the entire 
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scope of legitimacy as applicable to this hybrid. In fact, it only refers to the output legitimacy 
of an organisation and completely omits the input legitimacy discussed by Newman. Output 
legitimacy is based on the fact that legitimacy is acquired by the system of governance 
through the making of laws and decisions, which are beneficial for the people, regardless of 
its will. This is exactly the type of legitimacy described by Schuman as pragmatic legitimacy. 
Being more efficient at producing beneficial policies than the member-states’ governments, 
the EU is consequently legitimized. Some scholars defend output legitimacy as the ‘only’ 
route to legitimacy for the EU since it cannot implement input legitimacy because it would 
require direct participation, voting and party activity (Fritz 1999 cited in Newman 2006: 388). 
The EU should therefore focus on producing policies of democratic relevance in order to 
secure legitimacy, democratic relevance being best achieved by using the expertise of interest 
groups (Newman 2006: 388). However, output legitimacy is not persuasive enough in the 
European context since its configuration puts the people in a very weak position to exert 
pressure (see Beetham and Lord 1998 cited in Newman 2006: 388). In order to re-establish a 
balanced democratic link between the European institutions and the people, it is necessary to 
reinforce input legitimacy. Input legitimacy can be found in national structures thanks to 
universal elections, but must be achieve differently in the case of the Commission. It can be 
done by including a larger portion of the civil society movements, which could be a 
complement to the representation operated through member-states representatives (Hix and 
Lord 1997; Bellamy 2001 cited in Newman 2006: 388-389)) and by introducing participatory 
democracy through the use of referendums (Abromeit 1998 cited in Newman 2006: 389). 
However, this approach on input legitimacy emphasizes more on control and accountability 
than on active participation in policy-making as suggested by the normative vision of 
legitimacy through elections. This is why a discussion on participatory democracy becomes 
constructive for the future of European democracy.  It has been argued that both input and 
output legitimacy must be balance in order to achieve a democratic system (Pollack: 84; 
Newman 2006:  389). It means that the production of efficient policies is not enough for the 
EU to be able to reach the next step in its democratization process, and that the inclusion of 
the people has become inevitable.  
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Sociological institutionalism and the nature of lobbying 
The polity is a major aspect in the discussion on legitimacy. Indeed, the channels of 
legitimacy as discussed previously will vary greatly according to the polity in question. They 
are not, and cannot, be the same in a national hierarchical structure than in an international 
flat one. Therefore, we have to return to the traditional discussion on the nature of the EU. If 
legitimacy can be clearly linked to the electoral system in a national perspective, it is 
impossible to confine it to such measures in the European case. The EU structure of 
governance is less hierarchical and expertise11 plays a major role in the establishment of the 
scale of influence within the decision-making. By scale of influence, I refer to the place each 
of the actors in presence occupies in the decision-making process and their influence onto the 
result of this process. It is clear that the EU cannot be understood as a linear hierarchical type 
of governance and that another structure must be considered. In order to transcend the old 
cleavages between intergovernmentalists and federalists linked to a traditional linear 
conception of governance (i.e. hierarchical government), Marks and Hooghe (2003) have 
developed an alternative theoretical approach, which they named Multi‐level Governance 
(MLG), and which was rapidly adopted by a number of scholars of EU studies. In the case of 
the EU, lobbying must be understood within that new structure. In fact, it became increasingly 
obvious that “power was wielded by actors and groups both in and around the formal national 
and supranational institutions” (Warleigh 2006: 77). Therefore, MLG refers to the concept of 
governance as opposed to the traditional concept of government. To sum it up, MLG is “an 
approach that recognises state power but does not consider it the whole story” (Ibid 2006: 81). 
In the EU context, heavily institutionalised ways of doing politics are less predominant, and 
social alternative social actors have entered the policy-making process (Ibid 2006: 77). It is 
therefore very difficult to assert or deny legitimacy by simply focusing on electoral 
representation. MLG allows then for a better understanding of the EU polity and its working, 
which in turn gives better tools to discuss the question of legitimacy at that level.  Marks and 
Hooghe (2003: 236-238) distinguish two types of MLG at the EU level. The Type I 
Governance refers to a rigid and hierarchical structure resembling a federalist organisation. 
Several levels of governments are hierarchically linked in a nonintersecting, purpose-specified 
structure, so that they will be more efficient in their domain of expertise. Type I MLG relies 
on a strong sense of community and is more easily conducive to political representation. The 
                                                      
11  Expertise plays a major role in the integration of ENGOs has well.  
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Type II Governance is looser. The number of potential jurisdictions is vast and they have no 
clear demarcation, so that overlapping occurs. Their hierarchical structure is much looser as 
well and they are characterised by flexibility rather than durability. The classification of the 
EU as a type I governance by Marks and Hooghe can be discussed. As Warleigh points out 
(2006: 86-87), even if the EU appears, in theory, to fit in the type I governance, it is in fact 
sharing many of the characteristics of the type II governance. In this type of governance, 
political representation seems quasi unworkable because the EU is a very experimental form 
of policy-making relying on coalition-building and informal politics to a significant extent 
(Warleigh 2000; Richardson 2001; Christiansen and Piattoni 2003 cited in Warleigh 2006: 
78). The European governance is increasingly delegated to informal networks. The old 
centralized top-down form of government is losing ground in favour of other actors and 
institutional forms. It is replaced by a process-oriented model of governance structured in 
policy networks. Policy networks and MLG are best analysed together, especially in type II 
MLG. Actually, the diverse actors brought together in the policy-making process of the EU 
act in networks issued from functional and costs reduction needs. However, those networks 
cannot be reduced to merely functional symptoms because of the socialisation process they 
trigger. 
That perception of a MLG at the EU level is therefore best understood if one applies a 
sociological institutionalist prism to it. We have seen that policy-making cannot be reduced to 
formal institutions at the EU level. Moreover, the EU is a dynamic system in constant 
evolution. These two characteristics are particularly well tackled by sociological 
institutionalism (SI), which focuses on informal institutions in a dynamic process of 
socialisation rather than on formal institutions.  For SI, institutions are both formal and 
informal procedures, routines, norms and conventions embedded in the organisational 
structure of the polity (Hall and Taylor 1996: 938 cited in Wiener 2006: 36). Sociological 
institutionalism joins two concepts together, institutions and socialization. Institutions 
participate in insuring the continuity of the system and have a significant impact on the 
policy-making. Social practices in turn are considered as institutions, which will, in time, give 
birth to formal procedures of interaction (Wiener 2006: 39&44). It means that social 
institutions are mutually constitutive rather than mutually exclusive, and that the dynamic 
process of socialisation is more important than each institution’s initial standpoint. Social 
practices therefore become the main object of study rather than the formal institutional 
structure, since it is highly subject to modification by social practice. In other words, 
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according to SI, the interest groups will integrate the decision-making process because of the 
socialisation process and because the EU will ultimately believe in its own discourse. In our 
case, it means that the permanent contact of the EU institutions with interest groups will 
participate in the institutionalisation of their relation, which should increasingly switch from 
informal to formal. This is where the central dilemma on legitimacy of the institutions reaches 
its height. Actually, if other levels of non-governmental actors gain an increasing influence on 
the policy-making process, democratic safeguards must be established to insure that the 
system remain democratic. 
To conclude, the EU is not on the way to adopt a traditional federalist organization 
with a clear hierarchical sharing of functions. Therefore, the progressive entry of interest 
groups into the official modus operandi of the EU decision-making can be perceived as the 
apparition of another level in the governance system. In a strictly institutional perspective, the 
integration of those interest groups is not very formal yet. However, in a sociological 
institutionalism point of view, one can extract much meaning from the formalization of the 
relation between the Commission and interest groups. Formal institutions are not the only 
ones to influence the policy-making process (Warleigh, 2006). For example, the existence of 
the register of European lobbies is rather a symptom than a consequence of the influence of 
those interest groups in the policy-making process. A closer look at the practical interactions 
between environmental interest groups and the Commission in the context of the 
environmental policy-making will help to bring the theoretical debate to a more pragmatic 
level and to discuss if some ENGOs can legitimise the European environmental policy-
making.  
Participatory Democracy 
As we have seen before, the European Commission seeks to increase its legitimacy, 
and therefore reduce the democratic deficit, by including the civil society into the decision-
making process in order to legitimise its decisions. This process can be interpreted in different 
manners. In fact, for European models of democracy, legitimacy remains deeply rooted in 
representative democracy. One can therefore interpret the Commission as acting in a 
“representative democracy” perspective and as trying to prove that it is representing the 
interest of the governed. In order to do so, the Commission claims to listen to the needs of the 
European Citizens through the channel of the civil society. However, the integration of civil 
society into the decision-making process can have a deeper impact on the European 
democracy than simple representativity. Indeed, one can argue that including civil society into 
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the decision-making process open for another kind of democratic structure known as 
participatory democracy. This concept can be very useful in the discussion on the democratic 
deficit of the EU because it offers an alternative to the traditional representative democracy 
that presents several problems for the current European structure of governance. 
Participatory democracy is not a concept issued from the mind of educated scholars 
but rather an answer issued from left movements, during the second half of the twentieth 
century, to answer the problem of the concentration of representative power into major parties 
(Powell, 2008: 50). This answer was motivated by a growing concern for a problem linked to 
democratic deficit, voters’ apathy and increasing alienation of the states from the citizens 
(Ibid, 2008: 52). This situation called for the creation of new types of democratic 
organizations (ibid, 2008: 50; Friedrich, 2006: 2). Participatory democracy is a concept that 
has been created by opposition to representative democracy. It advocates that representation is 
not sufficient to insure an effective democracy and that the participation of citizens into the 
democratic processes can improve the democratic quality of the decisions taken. Participatory 
democracy strives to create opportunities for all members of a political group to make 
meaningful contributions to decision-making, and seeks to broaden the range of people who 
have access to such opportunities. Indeed the increasing distance between democratic 
representatives and the citizens they represent is at the heart of the present discussion on the 
democratic deficit of the EU and the crisis of legitimacy. In fact, how can we insure that 
decisions taken by increasingly specialized leaders are in adequacy with the will of the 
majority? This problem is even more important in the case of the EU since it has come to 
develop a type of decision-making based on efficiency and expertise, disconnected from any 
democratic concern. If we return to the problem exposed by Montesquieu on the nature of 
man and the necessity to limit the concentration of power, we can see that representative 
democracy has been introduced in order to limit the danger of one man to abuse power by 
submitting the rulers (representatives) to the ruled (the citizens). However, the alienation of 
citizens from their representatives shows that this solution is limited. Additional measures 
must therefore be taken in order to insure democracy. This solution is to be found in the 
participation of the citizens to the decision-making process in order to bring them closer to 
their leaders. This idea is not new; a major philosopher of democracy such as Aristotle 
already praised the superiority of the many on the one: “A mob judges better than any one of 
them, arbitrarily chosen, might. Similarly, many are more incorruptible, or indestructible, than 
the few (…)” (Winthrop, 1978: 159: book 1286a29-33). This superiority should not be viewed 
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in terms of efficiency, but rather in term of democracy. Therefore, legitimacy must not be 
limited to the efficiency of decisions for the well-being of the community. In fact, the more 
citizens will be included in the decision-making process, the more democratic this one will be. 
Participatory democracy can thus be seen as a way to bring back representatives and 
represented together in order to insure a sustainable democracy for the EU.  For John D. 
Wolfe, it can be done through the development and integration of organized groups from the 
civil society into the decision-making process. Actually, those groups can foster the 
maturation of collective solidarity in the form of an interest-based community, which can help 
to strengthen Man’s psychological and practical capacity for political participation, and thus 
its capacity to make constructive contributions (Wolfe, 1985: 371). In other words, the active 
participation of citizens to the decision-making process contains an educative quality that 
triggers the increasing inclusion and efficiency of the system. This educative claim of 
participation can, here again, be found in Aristotle’s work, who considers that by 
participating, the citizens increase their knowledge of the city’s matters and becomes “better 
at participating”, thus improving democracy (Winthrop, 1978: 169). By including the citizens 
into the decision-making process, participatory democracy provides them with the opportunity 
to learn how society is working and how to make better decisions, thus becoming a “better 
citizen”. In theory, this system is self sufficient and will automatically result in the 
improvement of European citizens. This is why the ENGOs can play an integrating role in the 
European democracy. In fact, they can be considered as the “transmission belt” between the 
citizens and the European decision-makers (Friedrich, 2006: 3, see also Friedrich, 2006: 7). In 
the same way that a transmission belt connects the engine to the wheels, ENGOs can connect 
citizens to the decision-making process taking place in the Commission. It has been argued 
that participation cannot be achieved through large-membership organization because of their 
tendency to mimic the oligarchic structure of governments, resulting in an elite-type 
concentration of power into the leadership and in the inefficiency of the above mentioned 
educative property (Michels in Wolfe, 1985: 372). However, the creation of a community-
based solidarity induced by those groups has a deeper impact on leadership itself, than 
Michels wants us to think. In fact, if one approaches this problem in a social constructivist 
point of view, one can see that it is not possible to make such a clear-cut separation between 
leadership and members. Indeed, as Aristotle argued, the participation itself contributes in 
including the citizen into the system, even though the structure does not appear to be 
favorable. Moreover, ENGO’s provides access, transparency and inclusion for the citizens, 
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because it gives them the opportunity to obtain information and participate in the decision-
making process. Participatory democracy presents numerous advantages, but we must keep in 
mind that it is still a very theoretical approach and that it must be adapted to the existing 
structure of governance of the EU in order to function. I will argue, As Sousa Santos (Santos 
in Powell, 2008: 54), that participatory democracy cannot fully replace representative 
democracy in the actual structure of European democracies due to reasons of scale, 
democratic traditions or citizens’ capacities; but it can be very constructive for the emerging 
European democracy if combined with the existing representative structure because it can 
improve three criteria of democracy: accessibility, transparency and inclusion. 
 
3. Empirical findings 
 
This analysis will constitute of a mix of several empirical data related to the object of 
study. They will be presented in two paragraphs, one examining the formal interaction 
through official publications: the regulation on CO2 emissions and the formal structure of 
interaction between the Commission and the ENGOs, represented by the register for interest 
representatives. The other one deepening this preliminary observation through interviews and 
through the report on the meeting of Lords with Catherine Day and Tony Long. A 
combination of both will help to establish the scale and the attributes of the interaction 
between the Commission and ENGOs in order to assess its social quality and its capacity to 
develop. 
Official publications – the tip of the iceberg 
If we look at an important environmental legislation for the industry, the regulation on 
CO2 emissions from passenger cars (COM(2007)856 final), it appears that the Commission’s 
claim of involving interest groups from the European civil society is verified. Many interest 
groups are present during the pre-proposal consultation procedure, both from industrial 
concerns and ENGOs, and their respective opinion is mentioned in the report following the 
consultation. However, the process is still at an early stage and the degree of involvement is 
very difficult to assess through the published reports. A formal procedure of assessment and 
consultation has indeed been carried out during the pre-proposal phase (public hearing for 
SEC(2007) 1723). This consultation included the DG for environment, the DG for enterprise 
and industry, interests from the automotive industries (both traditional and green industries) 
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and from various NGOs dealing with environment and consumer interests. Four of the Green 
10 members were present at the consultation. Transport & Environment seems to have had a 
leading role because it is the main source of information taken into consideration by the 
report. However, Greenpeace, WWF and FoE’s points of view are mentioned in annexe, 
which shows that their voice is given enough weight to be noted down in the official report. 
This observation does not allow assessing the quality of their inclusion, but it shows that this 
interaction exists and can therefore be the manure for socialisation. In fact, the more 
interaction will take place, the more those interest groups will have to find a formal position 
within the system. An interesting point is that none of the ENGOs questions the actual “120g 
target” fixed by the Commission, which shows that this target must have been discussed at an 
earlier stage without requirements for an official publication. Their main questions concern 
the method to achieve it, which they find to accommodating for the automotive industry. It is 
not surprising since their role is to keep the pressure on industries and politicians for more 
environmental regulation. What is more important is that they all seemed to agree about the 
target before discussing it during the assessment. Even The secretary-general of the 
Commission introduces the meeting by recalling that the target has been fixed and will not be 
discussed anymore. It is impossible though to find a report on the discussions that led to the 
establishment of the “120g” target, which is even supported by a highly dissenter ENGO such 
as Greenpeace (public hearing for SEC(2007) 1723, Greenpeace website: press release). The 
most logical answer is thus to assume that it has been agreed upon during an earlier stage of 
the process, which led to the publication of the official report. This earlier negotiation is not 
regulated by legal dispositions but indicates that the consultation procedure is not the only 
way in which ENGOs can have a say12. 
The last development in term of relation between the Commission and interest groups 
is the implementation of a voluntary register for interest groups in the frame of the 
transparency initiative (COM(2008)323 final). This register is managed by the secretariat 
general and aims at listing all the interest groups in relation with the Commission and making 
them available to the public as well as formalising the interaction between them and the 
Commission’s employees. It is a first step toward the formalisation of this relation but it is 
still very vague in term of quantity and depth of information. It does not seem that detailed 
information on the origin and use of funds as well as a list of actual lobbyists is required. 
                                                      
12  Interviews have revealed that ENGOs are members of expert groups at the earliest stage of the proposal 
drafting. This information will be treated in details in the extrapolated data. 
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There is a project of review of the Register by the Commission, but it still has not been carried 
on.  Moreover, it does not collect information on the formal meetings between representatives 
of those interest groups and the Commission in terms of dates, places and contents of 
discussion, which would participate to the transparency of the process. However, the initiative 
states that the Commission will progressively establish a formal procedure for consultation, 
which will lead to the publication of each consultation by the office in charge of the Register. 
It is still at the project stage, but it predicts that the institutionalisation of the interaction 
between the Commission and representatives of the civil society will increase in the future. 
This register only concerns the Commission but another register has been set up for the 
Parliament, which shows that both institutions are interested in formalizing this relation in 
order to increase transparency. The Commission is increasingly asking interest representatives 
to be registered in order to get an appointment or to participate to the consultation procedure. 
The same requirement is made by the MEPs, which often complain about being contacted by 
interest representatives, which are not registered. It indicates a will to formalize the 
procedure. Along the Register for interest representatives, the Commission is financing a 
number of NGOs every year in order to allow them to maintain a European representation in 
Brussels. This financing is frowned upon by some MEPs, which considers that public money 
should not be spent on private organisations, but when one looks at the budget of EIOs, it is 
clear that very few ENGOs could compete on their own. Moreover, this funding has been 
established by a resolution adopted by the Council and the Parliament, which indicate a clear 
desire of the majority to institutionalise their interaction with NGOs by insuring their stability 
in the system. In the case of ENGOs, Greenpeace is the only one of the Green 10 to refuse 
funds from the Commission. The funding is transparent and is based on the application of 
each NGO, in which they must explain how they intend to use the funds in order to promote 
European policies. There is no official instruction13 from the Commission on how ENGOs 
ought to think, but the mere fact that funds are given to projects that support European 
policies insure that they will not go against the general guidelines determined by those 
policies. The ENGOs are however free to choose their political line, which is more often in 
phase with their members than the interest of the Commission. Finally, the funds allocated to 
some international ENGOs are to be used only for expenditure within the EU 27. The 
Commission allocates money to the European Offices of those ENGOs in order to insure that 
                                                      
13  The only restriction of the Commission is that funds cannot be used for project outside the European Union, 
but there is no political restriction posterior to the attribution of funds.  
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those funds are used for the European citizens only, and regular audits takes place to control if 
they have been used properly. 
 
Interviews – deepening the study 
We have seen that the inclusion of ENGOs can be observed in the official publication 
of the Commission. However, this is but the tip of the iceberg. Interviews of the actors 
involved have revealed that the actual interaction between the Commission and ENGOs are 
more developed than official publications can let us think. A part of this interaction has even 
begun a process of institutionalisation. It comports therefore both formal and informal 
interactions between the two sides. This analysis will try to expose findings with limited 
comments. Those findings will then be discussed later on in the analytical discussion chapter. 
 
Formal methods of interactions are those that follow an established protocol without 
however being part of a structured process written down in the form of a treaty or legislation. 
Several procedures, by which ENGOs interact with the Commission, have been established 
over time. The most important one, in our case, is the participation of ENGOs in the working 
committees that produce guidelines and reports for the design of legislative proposal. Those 
working committees are composed of expert from various institutions, NGOs and EIOs; and 
are the key points in the decision-making process since they are the main source of expertise 
for the elaboration of proposals, which will eventually lead to regulations, directives and other 
types of European legislations. Both Greenpeace and WWF are systematically invited to take 
part in working committees by the DG environment, where they can influence the discussion 
by their expertise. This type of expert group is probably at the origin of the “120g target” that 
we discussed earlier on14. A lecture of the regulation on CO2 emissions from passenger cars 
and of the public consultation held for that purpose had showed that an agreement on the 
target of 120 g CO2 had been reached prior to the public earring. The fact that none of the 
four ENGOs present at the public consultation discusses this target could mean that a certain 
consensus has been reached within the working committee in charge of that matter. Both 
Greenpeace and WWF expressed the importance of their participation within those groups 
and that they actually have a good collaboration with the Commissioners and the other parties 
in presence. However, there is no written procedure to determine how DG environment select 
                                                      
14 Cf. ”factual data” p.19 
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which ENGOs to invite in a specific working committee. This choice is left to the employee 
of DG environment in charge of the dossier. There are several criteria for the selection of 
actors to invite. In the case of DG environment, expertise is a major criterion. Indeed, 
environmental policy is an area, which requires advanced technological knowledge on how 
the environment reacts to human activity and how it works in general. Both WWF and 
Greenpeace seem to be recognised for the quality of their expertise by DG environment and 
are very often invited to participate in expert groups. It gives them the opportunity to 
influence efficiently the decision-making process at the roots, thus including them at a key 
point of the environmental policy. Of course, the fact that they are invited, included and 
listened too, does not insure that their voice is heard as the voice of others, but it insures their 
democratic participation to the process. They are also recognised because of the size of their 
membership. Both Greenpeace and WWF rely on their large number of members to legitimize 
their voice, which is a very good point in term of representative democracy, since they can 
represent a large amount of citizens at the EU level. They also rely a lot on the public opinion 
in that they use their capacity to communicate and bring attention to specific subject in order 
to put pressure on the decision-makers so that they consider their opinion. On the one hand, it 
can be problematic in term of participatory democracy, since it is clear that smaller 
organisation will lack a large number of members as well as the budget for developing 
qualified expertise. Thus not having access to the decision-making process because they will 
not be able to reach the level of reputation needed to be included by the Commission. On the 
other hand, it can ensure than only the most representative ENGOs are included, which ensure 
a workable number of channels of participation established by democratic support. Indeed, it 
is better to have few functioning channels of participation than a multitude of imperfect ones.  
 A second formalised method of lobbying is the use of factual and voting sheets. 
Factual sheets are produced by ENGOs on specific subjects in order to communicate their 
official position. They can be established through independent studies commissioned by the 
ENGO, which can compete with studies commissioned by EIOs. They can be addressed to 
members of the Parliament, the Commission or the Council, who can use them to know the 
position of major ENGOs or for qualified expertise. They are a part of the communication 
tools of the ENGOs with the European institutions. They are not an institutionalised part of 
the decision-making process, which means that the European institutions do not have to take 
them into account or to include them within the official reports. However, the fact that the 
Commission accept those ENGOs as valuable partners supposes that they will listen to their 
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voice in a certain way. Voting sheets are a type of factual sheets that are directly aimed at the 
Parliament in the occasion of votes on major environmental issues. They contain the position 
of the ENGO and a clear recommendation for voting. Both factual and voting sheets 
participate in the dispositive of pressure implemented by those ENGOs, which largely rely on 
public opinion to support their voice. 
 
Informal interactions are those that do not follow any protocol, but still participate in 
the connection between the Commission and ENGOs. The first informal interaction between 
the Commission and the ENGOs is the fact that they meet for professional purpose on a daily 
basis. The Commission recognises both ENGOs as valuable and effective partners and they 
are welcome to meet with its employees. Those meetings can have various purposes and are 
not recorded. In the case of WWF, it seems that informal meetings takes place along those 
official ones, and that personal relations are developed as well. The extent of those relations is 
impossible to assess though, but the mere fact that they take place indicate a process of 
socialisation that will strengthen further interactions. On the other side, Greenpeace insist on 
having only official appointments with employees of the Commission and do not use the 
means of dinners and informal meetings as many EIOs’ lobbyists do. Nevertheless, they are a 
part of the Green10 network, which holds a regular dinner with representatives of the 
Commission to discuss environmental matters as well as one-time meetings with 
representatives of the country in charge of the presidency, as well as the preceding and the 
following ones, at each turn of the presidency. One can expect that people working on an 
everyday basis on the same subjects develop a certain level of acquaintance, which facilitates 
further interactions. Especially since all actors agree on the fact that Greenpeace and WWF 
are valuable participants within the decision-making process. Those meetings are important 
for the formation of the image each actor has of each other. The more they know the positions 
and the methods of the other actors, the easiest they will collaborate in the future.  
A second informal interaction is the traditional method of pressure traditionally used 
by ENGOs. Those methods can take the form of petitions and attention bringing actions, 
which base their power in the public opinion. Those types of activities are most common to 
the national offices, but they are also used towards the Commission. Those methods can be 
used in order to influence the agenda setting or a decision of a European institution. An 
example is the production of scorecards classifying countries according to their 
implementation of an environmental directive in order to push the less effective countries to 
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take measures. In the case of REACH15, WWF made a campaign in order to sensitize the 
members of the Parliament to the presence of chemicals in our bodies. The survey of human 
toxic contamination showed that 76 persistent, bio-accumulative and toxic industrial 
chemicals were present in the blood of the tested MEPs. The purpose of this action was to 
attract the attention of the MEPs on the fact that all European were concerned by the problem. 
This is a method, which the ENGOs masters since they enjoy the support of numerous 
European citizens as well as the capacity and the knowledge to attract attention on the 
decision-makers at the most appropriate moment to influence their decision. The fact that they 
are a part of the decision-making process gives them the necessary information to determine 
that moment as well as the most cost/time effective method.  
 
ENGOs as counter-balance 
 One important point that came back in each interview was the fact that the 
Commission can use the ENGOs as counterbalance to the EIOs. Indeed, the EIOs carry out 
heavy lobbying activities towards the Commission. They possess large budget for the 
commission of scientific studies supporting their interests or the remuneration of a multitudes 
of lobbyists. The role of the Commission is to act as a mediator capable of taking the best 
decisions for the entire society, while satisfying the largest part. In order to do so, it relies on 
expertise. The expertise of the EIOs is not always the most objective and the Commission 
needs other sources of information in order to promote a more balanced legislation. This is 
where the ENGOs can be very valuable, since they operate with a non-mercantile goal and 
therefore tends to be stricter on the regulations to apply to the protection of the environment. 
For example, the agro-industries were arguing that the EU should withdraw its ban on some 
GMOs16 on the ground that they were accepted in the rest of the world and that the EU should 
stop being protectionists. That argument was proven false by Greenpeace since only the 
United States has authorised more GMOs than the EU, while the rest of the world tends to 
follow the European legislation on that matter. Following that input of Greenpeace, the text 
was never implemented. Moreover, it appears that some employees of the Commission use 
ENGOs when they consider that the content of the proposal, on which they are working, 
reflects too much the interest of the industries. This situation varies on a case-to-case basis, 
but shows the value of the integration of ENGOs within the decision-making process. It helps 
                                                      
15  European regulation on chemicals  
16  Genetically modified organism 
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bring balance to the equation and it is recognised as valuable by both the Commission and the 
ENGOs. They can also be used in order to maintain balance within the Commission itself. 
When the Barroso Commission was appointed, the entire Commission was focused on the 
new goals established by the Lisbon strategy and relegated the seven strategies of the sixth 
environmental action program to the archives. When, Stavros Dimas, the Commissioner for 
environment realised that they were not ready to support the commitments made by the 
previous Commission in the sixth EAP, he asked the ENGOs to help put pressure on the 
Commission so they would respect their obligations. This was a successful lobbying action, 
which resulted in the reintroduction of the seven strategies. The question of balance of powers 
is crucial for democratic regimes, not only in an institutional perspective, but also for the 
general operation of decision-making. ENGOs can therefore be considers as useful partners of 
that process.  
How both parties perceive the interaction 
This assessment will first consider a report of the meeting between representatives 
from the British House of Lords, the secretary general of the Commission (Catherine Day) 
and the director of WWF European policy office (Tony Long); then make the connection to 
the interviews held with the representatives of each actor. The meeting was held with the 
purpose of assessing the degree of connection and collaboration between the Commission and 
WWF EPO. According to the report, the Commission and this NGO meet each other during 
the policy-making process and both claim a significant degree of collaboration. The secretary 
general explains that they need such collaboration in order to gain the necessary knowledge to 
make the most appropriate decisions, but also to ensure that all the points of view from all the 
actors of the civil society are represented in the proposal. However, without denying an 
informal relationship in the ‘corridors of Brussels’, she tries to emphasise the formalisation of 
the consultation of interest groups during the pre-proposal phase and the new ‘voluntary 
register for interest representatives’ managed by the Commission. The interview with an 
environmental officer of the DG environment confirm that working relation and insists on the 
fact that the ENGOs are appreciated and valued by the Commission for their alternative 
qualified expertise, and thus well integrated into the decision-making process. Tony Long also 
recognises a good cooperation but gives it a more informal tone. He explains how the Green 
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10 network17 had been able to influence the new Commission when, in 2005, It was 
questioning the ‘seven strategies’18 adopted by the previous Commission. He also explains 
the role of monitoring played by ENGOs and their capacity to expose noncompliance with 
environmental decisions. They can also commission independent studies in order to introduce 
them into the legislative process (which they share through the Green 10 network). The 
Commission keeps them informed during the entire proposal-making process. He also 
develops on the informal relationship behind some decisions made by the commission. 
However, he recognises that opposing interest groups have had very successful impacts on the 
Commission, such as in the REACH case19, which shows that EIOs do have a strong 
influence on the decisions taken by the Commission. During her interview, Marta Vertier also 
recognises the good collaboration of Greenpeace with the Commission. They have a proper 
access to information and to the expert groups set up for the elaboration of environmental 
legislation. Overall, both Greenpeace and WWF recognise a successful inclusion within the 
decision-making process, which they attributes to the credit given to their expertise, the 
importance of their membership support and their acceptance of the “rules of the Game”. 
Greenpeace and WWF consider that they are recognised, listened too and invited to 
participate in a relatively satisfactory degree. 
However, the situation is not always so ideal. The Commission makes an effort in term 
of inclusion and transparency, but they remain limited. For example, ENGOs do not have 
access to information on what is happening during the conciliation procedure between the 
Commission, the Council and the Parliament20. Moreover, they regret the fact that they often 
have the impression of being heard, but ignored. White papers are sometime published 
without a single reference to their inputs, or they reflect too much the desires of a specific 
EIO and omit the inputs of other actors. They also observed cases where the revision of a 
piece of legislation did not consider their inputs. It can be because the choice to integrate 
some inputs more than others relies on the employee of the Commission in charge and that his 
political configuration, as well as the ones of the Commission ultimately influences his 
judgement. This observation holds true for most democratic institutions and represent an 
eternal problem, which can hardly be solved by regulations. Finally, it seems that ENGOs 
                                                      
17 Green 10 is an informal network of the 10 major interest groups in environmental protection in the EU. See 
following paragraph on Green 10 network for more information.  
18 Series of legislative goals linked to the 6th Environment Action Program.  
19 REACH: European Regulation on hazardous chemical products.  
20 This appeared clearly when the Council modified the proposal for a regulation on CO2 emissions, attracting 
the disapproval of many environmental NGOs. See also letter of Green 10 to the commission. 
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suffer of a lack of feedback from the Commission. Indeed, they do not receive comments on 
each of their inputs and sometimes wonder if they have really been taken into consideration. 
This shows that even though they have been relatively well integrated to the decision-making 
process, they are still not an integrated part of it, and that the institutionalisation of that 
interaction can still be improved.  
 
 
4. Analytical Discussion: improving democracy in 
the European Union 
 
The previous observations can bring new perspective to two different discussions. The 
first one will revolve around the socialisation process, which brings interest groups closer to 
the Commission. The second will focus on the legitimacy this interaction can bring to the EU.  
Socialisation Processes 
As we have seen, the relation between environmental interest groups and the 
Commission is not completely structured yet. There are few formal rules that establish the 
procedures and the degree of involvement they should have during the policy-making process. 
However, it is undeniable that they have a certain influence on the Commission. In a 
sociological institutionalism point of view, this phenomenon becomes very interesting. In 
fact, we are witnessing a process of socialisation through informal institutions, which started 
during the seventies. This process is slowly moving toward a more formal relation, as pointed 
out by the Transparency Initiative and the Register for interest groups created in June 2008. 
There is a clear will from the Commission and the Parliament to include interest groups from 
the civil society within the decision-making process. Both institutions are presently working 
on a common register that will formalise the first step of the integration of interest-
representatives21. This process is still at the early phase of socialisation, but it is likely to 
continue and bring interest groups even closer to the EU. ENGOs have been present within 
the decision making process for many years. It appears that the Commission and the 
Parliament are increasingly interested in officialising this union in order to improve 
                                                      
21  An agreement on a common register has been reached on March 17th, 2009. It could be implemented by the 
end of the year. See http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/kallas/doc/news12_03_09.pdf 
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transparency as stated in the transparency initiative. In such a scenario, it is important to 
consider their role and their capacity to improve democracy to the EU. 
ENGOs as channel of legitimacy: representative democracy 
Now that it has been established that NGOs will come to play a more and more 
important role in the policy-making process, one must discuss to which extent they fulfil the 
search for legitimacy of the Commission. Legitimacy has several aspects, but the main one is 
the fact that the people need to be linked to the policy-making process in order to develop the 
necessary feelings that will bring legitimacy to the Commission. In the case of the European 
Union, that link does not need to be bound to direct elections. Direct elections are linked to 
the normative legitimacy in place among European countries, but we have seen that this type 
of legitimacy will be very difficult for the Commission to achieve in the present political 
configuration. However, the Commission can gain the legitimacy linked to representative 
democracy by other means. If one considers the participation of ENGOs within the decision-
making process of the Commission, one can see that they are a new channel for 
representativity. The ENGOs are structured in such way that they automatically bring forward 
the opinions of their members. Indeed, ENGOs do not exist outside of their members and their 
main goal is to gather as many of them as possible around a thematic subject. If at any time 
their politic diverge from the desires of their members, they risk disappearance. It can 
therefore be argued that they most effectively represent their members in a very specific 
political area. Moreover, in the case of Greenpeace and WWF, membership is open to any 
adult with a bank account and a valid address within the country of residence of the national 
office. Membership fees tend to be very symbolical to gather the largest amount of members 
possible. On top of direct elections, legitimacy can be linked to efficiency, transparency and 
participation. Efficiency in the fact that the decisions taken must fit with the needs of the 
people22, transparency in the fact that the people must be informed in an understandable and 
direct manner of the reason for such decisions and finally participation in the fact that people 
need to feel that they can participate if they choose so23. The Commission already fulfils the 
criteria of Efficiency, but transparency and participation can be greatly improved by the 
NGOs mentioned previously. Actually, they base a large part of their work on communication 
                                                      
22  Legitimacy through efficiency is the one described by Jean Monnet and on which the EU was built.  
23  Participation is linked to the discussion on participatory democracy in chapter 3. It also includes accessibility, 
transparency and inclusion.  
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to the public and on the participation of their members into the process. They could therefore 
participate to the reconciliation of the public with the Commission, and thus to its legitimacy.  
“Elitisation” of the ENGOs 
Robert Michels has brought up the problem of specialisation and “elitisation” of large-
member organisations such as Unions, a type of organisation similar to the NGOs.  Michels 
argues that modern organization renders participatory democracy impracticable because it 
invariably results in leaders dominating followers (Wolfe, 1985: 2). It results in the creation 
of oligarchic type of structures that prevent any forms of participation and limit the 
democratic connection between the base and the leadership, which was the basement for the 
legitimacy of such organisations. This problematic is interesting to discuss because it has also 
been raised by Tony Long (director of WWF EPO), who is concerned that WWF employees 
at the European Policy Office were ultimately mimicking the elite structure of the 
Commission in order to be accepted within the policy-making process, thus becoming elite 
themselves. The more ENGOs mimic elite behaviours, the more distance they put between 
them and their support. In that case, it is difficult for them to keep the claim of legitimacy 
linked to that top-bottom connection. However, it seems that Michels’ assertion is 
exaggerated. Indeed, there are several factors, which can contribute to the limitation of such 
an oligarchic structure. First, the fact that the director of WWF EUO is concerned by this 
problem shows that he is aware of it. There is consequently less chances for the formation of 
an oligarchic structure in that case. Secondly, the functioning of the ENGOs itself participate 
in strengthening the link between base and top through the formation of a collective solidarity 
(community) (Wolf, 1985: 3), which ultimately bring the leadership closer to the base from 
which they are issued. This collective solidarity is the cement that link smaller units together 
in larger sub-units, which finally associate to form the ENGO in question. This community is 
what insures that leaders adopt interests issued from the base in order to insure its durability. 
Moreover, as Aristotle already argued more than two thousand years ago, this community 
possesses an educative capacity, which benefits each of its members. Each of the members 
acquires the possibility to participate through the collective solidarity, which in turn gives 
them the knowledge to act more efficiently and to take wiser decision, making them ‘better’ 
members. In the case of Greenpeace and WWF, the link between the top and the base seems 
well developed. Indeed, the goals and politic of the European offices are decided within a 
board of management composed of the directors of the largest national offices, which 
themselves represent the interest of their national office. Moreover, the structure of such 
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ENGOs gives place to the participation of their members through petitions and voluntary 
work, which include them within the elaboration of the common goal of the collective 
solidarity and reduce the risk of oligarchy.  
Linking citizens and decision-makers: participatory democracy 
 The Commission suffers a lack of legitimacy in a representative democracy 
perspective because it is not composed of elected representatives, but of appointed officials. 
The “legitimacy of efficiency” advocated by Jean Monnet24 in a context where the EU was 
still a remote international system has reached its limits. This problem has already been at the 
centre of the debate on the democratic deficit of the EU. In theory, the Commission is not 
directly accountable to the people when it takes decisions. The introduction of direct elections 
for the Commission, or the inclusion of channels of representation from the civil society such 
as NGOs and unions, may be a solution. However, the democratic deficit is a broader problem 
than pure political representation. Indeed, the question of democratic deficit concerns also 
national governments. This question is linked to a growing apathy of the voters as well as an 
alienation of the citizens from the state (Powell, 2008: 52). Low turnouts are not limited to the 
European elections and can be found in national elections like for example in the United 
Kingdom (Wright, 2006: 236). This symptom shows that the limits of representative 
democracy itself have been reached. Therefore, it might not be the solution for the resolution 
of the democratic deficit, since it will only transfer a problem already present at the national 
level. This problem is linked to the psychological side of legitimacy as discussed earlier on. 
The Commission is lacking both cognitive and pragmatic legitimacy. According to the low 
turnouts at the European elections, it seems that European citizens do not believe that the 
European institutions are accountable to them or at least efficiently representing their 
interests. This disbelief also affects the Commission.  
The inclusion of civil society within the decision-making process, on the other side, 
shows very promising possibilities. The two ENGOs studied can be valuable models for the 
implementation of participation within the European democratic system. The present studies 
have revealed that the interaction between the Commission and the ENGOs is functioning 
better than official publications would let us think. Representatives from both Greenpeace and 
WWF recognise a good access to the decision making process, and are included by the 
commission. Even though the actual interaction can be improved, they present a valuable 
                                                      
24 Cf. Discussion on the white paper on governance p.3 
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channel for the implementation of ground principles of participatory democracy such as 
transparency, accessibility and inclusion25. They can help spread information from the EU to 
the citizens because they already base their functioning on high communication skills, allow 
access to the decision-making process for their members and present a relatively good level of 
inclusion. In that way, ENGOs are a good channel for participation and should be considered 
in further discussion on the democratic deficits. Those qualities can be very useful to 
reconnect the European citizens with the European structure of governance since the ENGOs 
are highly inclusive. They are inclusive in the sense that they rely on the number of their 
members to support their voice, thus being open to all citizens.  
On top of it, they can improve the quality of the already existing European democracy. 
Indeed, if they can trigger participation among the European citizens, they automatically 
contribute to the educative quality of participation. The more citizens will take part, the better 
“participant” they will become. One could parallel it to the discussion of Aristotle on “the 
democrat”, who becomes a better and better democrat through its involvement in the affairs of 
the city, thus improving the overall quality of the democracy in which he evolves (Winthrop, 
1978:169). It can also improve the European democracy by the fact that the more citizens will 
be included, the more democratic the resulting decisions will be. Here again, this position is 
shared by Aristotle, which already recognised that “a mob judges better than any one of them, 
arbitrarily chosen, might” (Aristotle in Winthrop, 1978: 159). This sentence reflects the fact 
that consultation and consensus are always an improvement for democracy, two traits that can 
be enhanced by the presence of ENGOs within the European system of governance.  
 
Conclusion: Discussing democracy 
 
The democratic deficit is based on the fact that European citizens do not have a direct 
electoral power over two of the major European Institutions. The Commission is trying to 
gain democratic legitimacy by including the civil society (and NGOs) into the decision-
making process26. The present study has established that this relation was relatively well 
functioning. It can bring a new perspective to the concept of political representation in the 
EU. Actually, until now, the concept of political representation was limited to elected 
representatives and therefore to the European Parliament. However, one can discuss to which 
                                                      
25  Cf. Participatory democracy, ch. 2 § 3 
26  Cf. White Paper on Governance 
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extend supporting an NGO with a political program is different from supporting a political 
party with another political program. It will finally depend on the organization of the political 
system itself. For example, in the Danish political system, representation through unions can 
be considered as important as representation through the political system, when it comes to 
political decision-making in labour policy area27. Moreover, NGOs are providing channels of 
information and socialisation for the European citizens, which can reduce the gap between 
them and the EU.  
Nevertheless, we know the significant number of interest groups involved in the 
process, which makes it difficult to establish and control an effective system of governance. 
Therefore, it is still impossible to advocate the replacement of a traditional political 
representation by one based on the participation of citizens through interest groups from the 
civil society. It would be, for the time being, unworkable. However, I advocate that 
representative democracy is not enough anymore and that it can be highly improved by the 
introduction of channels of participation within the democratic structure of the EU. The 
participation of NGOs can become a valuable complementation to the European democracy 
because it can form a channel of representation and participation for the citizens, which can 
help the EU overcome its democratic deficit, reconnect the citizens with their leaders, and 
with the notion of democracy. ENGOs are very interesting because they present a well-
established and well functioning cooperation with the Commission, which can be used as 
model for the establishment of similar type of cooperation within other policy areas. ENGOs 
can bring alternative expertise and counter-balance the pressure of industries and financial 
sectors, which are becoming more and more influential in a globalised system of governance, 
a fact that is probably responsible for the progressive alienation of citizens from their 
governments.  
Opening 
This research presents but a minor section of the overall structure of interaction between the 
Commission and the civil-society. Moreover, the democratic deficit of the EU is not limited to 
the Commission and concerns the entire system of governance. The present thesis focuses on 
the Commission and the ENGOs because they present a valuable source of inspiration for 
tackling the problem of democratic deficit, although other studies could beneficially 
complement the present one. Further research should focus on the same type of relation 
                                                      
27  Not a single law concerning the labour market and worker rights is passed without the approval of state, 
unions and employers together.  
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between ENGOs and other European institutions in order to assess their integration within the 
overall system; and between EIOs and European institutions in order to better understand their 
weight within the equation described earlier on.  
Moreover, a democratisation through civil-society requires looking at two stages of 
this system. Firstly, at the efficacy of the interaction between the Commission and the ENGOs 
to be sure that those ENGOs are integrated within the decision-making process. Secondly, at 
the actual possibilities for representation and participation of basic members within those 
ENGOs in order to address the critic of elitism voiced by the director of WWF EPO and by 
Robert Michels, which was mentioned in that thesis, but not fully answered. This study 
focused on the first stage. Further research should therefore focus on the actual possibilities of 
participation for the basic members of those ENGOs would therefore be a valuable 
complement to the present paper. 
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